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Service industries have been evolving as the 
major industries in the global economy and need 
support from research on issues related to service 
science and management to promote further growth and 
extend the expansion boundaries. This paper discusses 
previous investigations concerning the interwoven field 
of revenue management and service science and 
examines several crucial issues associated with 
theoretical and empirical studies regarding this 
interwoven field, including consumer choice, global 
price responsiveness, and information structure to 
provide suggestions for designing a research framework. 
Finally, research directions and suggestions are 





Production and exchange are the two major 
elements which interweave the core framework of a 
global interactive economy. Real goods and services are 
produced with inputs of real goods and services already 
produced for the ultimate goal of providing benefits to 
consumers through a process of successive transactions 
which take place at costs measurable by the quantities 
of real goods and services needed for the successive 
transactions to be undertaken. Obviously, production 
and exchange are unlikely to take place without 
services provided and consumed. Services of various 
types appear to play a dominant role in the operation of 
a global economy in that they are not merely the final 
commodities for consumption, but the inputs for 
production and exchange as well. Service industries, 
each as a collection of firms providing an identical type 
of service, have been evolving as the major industries 
with the expansion of production, exchange, and 
consumption in the global economy.  
Decisions made by providers and consumers with 
regard to production, exchange, or consumption are 
related to service management. Service providers need 
to take into consideration revenues, costs, and benefits 
associated with their production and exchange 
decisions, while in their decision making consumers 
consider the major factors such as the costs on specific 
services they desire to acquire and the benefits 
associated with them. The expenditures spent by 
service consumers are the revenues acquired by service 
providers, which implies the importance of consumer 
behavior and decision-making to revenue management 
for service industries. As mentioned by Chiang, Chen, 
and Xu (2007), in order to assure business competency 
and maximize revenue firms provide and manage 
service packages for different market segments by 
acquiring information regarding customers’ behavior 
and value functions in designing managerial strategies 
and revenue management systems with applications of 
appropriate combinations of strategies such as price, 
quality, purchase restrictions, information revelation, 
and distribution channels. This paper is to review 
previous investigations concerning the interwoven field 
of revenue management and service science and 
addresses several crucial issues associated with 
theoretical and empirical studies regarding this 
interwoven field, including consumer choice, global 
price responsiveness, and information structure to 
provide suggestions for future research on revenue 
management with incomplete information. 
Representatives of traditional industries applying 
strategies of revenue management include 
transportation, hotels, and rental car industries. These 
traditional industries can be characterized by a common 
type with attributes concerning their costs, products, 
and demand. Firms in these industries need to bear 
significantly high fixed costs for a long term of 
operation while incurring small variable costs for 
operation in the short run. Their products are perishable 
in the sense that the commodities available to 
customers at one point of time will no longer exist at 
the next point of time. The demand for the products can 
be characterized by a significantly changing stochastic 
process. With technological innovations and changes in 
managerial contexts, traditional manufacturing and 
retailing industries also engage in adopting RM 





emerging industries as restaurant, entertainment, 
healthcare, IT and internet, and apartment-renting 
service industries. Research results concerning design 
of feasible and optimal RM strategies and related issues 
for various types of industries have been reported by 
researchers and practitioners concerned with issues 
related to industrial operation outcomes associated with 
revenue-generating (e.g., Arora and Fosfuri, 2005; 
Chen, Lin and Hsieh, 2008; Gal-Or et. al., 2006; Geng, 
Stinchcombe, and Whinston, 2005; Harris, 2007; 
Kimms and Muller-Bungart, 2007; Sundararajan, 2004). 
Embedded commonly in the analytical frames of these 
studies are pricing and consumer response, information 
structures, and solution concepts. In the following 
sections, attention will be drawn first to some of the 
crucial issues related to consumer choice and global 
price responsiveness, while a measure-theoretic 
perspective of information, taken in important 
analytical frameworks, will be discussed. 
 
2. CONSUMER CHOICE 
 
Traditionally, analysis of consumer choice is 
based on the formulation of maximizing behavior in 
economics and management. As mentioned by Sen 
(1996), maximizing behavior is different from 
nonvolitional maximization and the fundamental 
relevance of the choice act has to be placed in a central 
position in analyzing behavior. The specific features of 
an individual’s act of choice may include the identity of 
the chooser, the set of items or the menu, as presented 
by Sen, over which choice is being made, and the set of 
social relations and norms which may influence choice 
of social actions. A set of comprehensive outcomes 
should include the entire choice process and a chooser’s 
preferences over a set of comprehensive outcomes 
should be distinguished from the conditional 
preferences over culmination outcomes given the acts 
of choice. There may exist responsibility associated 
with choice, which can influence the ranking of the 
narrowly-defined outcomes and the chooser’s decision. 
The specific features of the act of choice may influence 
a chooser’s preference and choice function representing 
her preference. Theoretical or empirical studies in the 
line of research on revenue management and service 
science need to consider these specific features of the 
act of choice in a process perspective. Researchers have 
attempted to represent the choices of economic agents, 
in particular the consumer, the supplier, and the 
governments, in a process perspective to analyze the 
sequential interactions among these agents and extend 
understanding of related issues beyond static analysis 
(e.g., Balachander, 2001; Gul, Sonnenschein and 
Wilson, 1986; Ma and  McGuire, 1997; Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1982; Rubinstein,1982). 
With regard to one more significant feature in the 
act of choice, Sen (1996) noted that the act of choice 
may be subject to the inescapability or urgency of 
choice in that a chooser may have to arrive at a 
reflected judgment by balancing conflicting 
considerations at the time of choice. The feature of 
choice inescapability or urgency may add to the 
complexity of the process of choice. Furthermore, Sen 
mentioned that serious problems may arise in the 
characterization of maximization behavior as 
optimization, as commonly adopted in much of 
economic analysis. A maximizing act of choice only 
requires choosing an alternative that is not judged to be 
worse than any other and optimization is quite 
unnecessary for maximization.  
Within a revenue management context, 
interaction among consumers, such as arbitraging 
behavior, may bring complexities to the feasibility of 
the strategies service providers may adopt. As 
mentioned by Tirole (1988) as examples of consumer 
choice in the presence of mutual interaction, with the 
transferability of the commodity, the introduction of 
quantity discounts would provide consumers with an 
incentive to harvest arbitraging benefits in the absence 
of transaction costs in that only one consumer buy the 
product and resell it to other consumers. Whenever a 
variable quantity of consumption of the arbitraged good 
is linked with a fixed quantity of consumption, two-part 
tariffs can be applied to limit the arbitraging behavior. 
Another difficulty with which service providers may be 
confronted is the type of consumer choice in the form 
of transferability of demand between different packages 
or bundles of service commodities offered to 
consumers of various tastes. In order to increase 
revenue, providers of service commodities may target a 
specific package of service commodities for consumers 
of a specific type and want to make sure that consumers 
of a specific type indeed choose the package designed 
for them but not the packages designed for other types 
of consumers. In order to induce consumers to make 
choices as desired in the absence of information about 
the exact type of each individual consumer, service 
providers may provide incentive-compatibility 
constraints on the set of packages and use self-selection 
devices so that each consumer would not have an 
incentive to switch from the package of service 
commodities designed for him to other packages 
designed for other types of consumers. 
 
3. GLOBAL PRICE RESPONSIVENESS 
 
Consumer responsiveness to price is frequently 
adopted to refer to consumer choice in confrontation 
with price schemes set by service providers and 
represented by the quantitative measure of price 
elasticity. In the perspective of revenue management, 




adjustment to increase revenue. While a decrease in 
price may lead to an increase in the quantity purchased 
by the consumer, the change in the total revenue 
received by the provider is ambiguous. The 
responsiveness of consumers to price as measured by 
price elasticity provides an intuitive explanation for the 
phenomenon. For a product whose demand is inelastic 
with respect to price, the percentage change in the 
quantity demanded will be smaller than the 
corresponding percentage change in price and the 
magnitude of a decrease in price will more than offset 
the magnitude of the corresponding increase in the 
number of units sold, bringing about a decrease in 
revenue and thus a change in revenue in the same 
direction as the price change. On the other hand, with 
elastic demand, the percentage change in the quantity 
demanded will be larger than the corresponding 
percentage change in price and the magnitude of the 
corresponding increase in the number of units sold will 
outweigh the magnitude of a decrease in price, leading 
to an increase in revenue and thus a change in revenue 
in the reverse direction as the price change.  
Given the responsiveness of consumers to price, 
it would be more likely for the region of high price to 
correspond to elastic demand, while inelastic demand 
may be more likely to lie in the region of low price. As 
implied by the responsiveness of consumers to price, in 
order to promote revenue it would be more feasible to 
lower price in the region of high price, while to raise 
price would be more likely to contribute to revenue in 
the presence of low price. Researchers have examined 
how providers adjust price and other strategies such as 
quality and scarcity in response to consumer 
responsiveness to price in various interactive 
managerial contexts (e.g., Chambers, Kouvelis, and 
Semple, 2005; McAfee and Velde, 2008; Stock and 
Balachander, 2005).  
Chambers, Kouvelis, and Semple (2005) studied 
the competitive behavior in a duopoly with respect to 
quality and price in a two-stage game by using a 
surplus utility function characterized by a uniformly 
distributed price sensitivity parameter,  transformed 
from the net utility function with a taste parameter as 
employed by Moorthy (1988) and later by Ronnen 
(1991) and Lehmann-Grube (1997). By offering a 
signaling explanation for the optimality of pricing and 
product-scarcity strategies, Stock and Balachander 
(2005) showed how a pricing strategy would be 
designed in accordance with a product-scarcity strategy 
and a high-quality seller may credibly signal the quality 
of its product to uninformed customers by optimally 
choosing to make the product scarce. Considering a 
good that is valueless if not sold by a terminal period, 
McAfee and Velde (2008) examined a dynamic pricing 
problem adapted from Gallego and van Ryzin (1994), 
with the constant demand elasticity assumed to be 
larger than one. They followed Gallego and van Ryzin 
to construct the Bellman equation for the problem and 
demonstrated that the monopoly prices are socially 
efficient with constant elasticity of demand. As they 
mentioned, the result is attributable to the nature of 
marginal revenue with constant elasticity of demand. To 
achieve his goal, the monopolist equates marginal 
revenue across time. With constant elasticity of demand, 
prices and marginal costs are proportional to each other 
and equating one equates the other. Since efficiency 
requires equating the expected prices charged across 
time and the solution to the monopoly problem entails 
selling all the units, this result demonstrates the 
coincidence of monopoly and perfect competition with 
constant elasticity and fixed supply. The coincidence of 
monopoly and perfect competition with constant 
elasticity and fixed supply, as pointed out by McAfee 
and Velde, was discovered by Stiglitz (1976) in another 
context, in which a resource with a fixed supply, such 
as oil, copper, and iron, must be allocated over time.  
Within a global interactive context, prices of 
substitutes and complements are taken into 
consideration not merely by consumers of various types 
in making their consumption decisions, but by 
providers in designing their revenue management 
strategies as well. Even with the narrowly-defined 
outcomes such as a commodity vector containing a set 
of commodities which can be partitioned into two 
disjoint subsets with one containing domestic 
commodities and the other containing foreign 
commodities, exchange rates play a crucial role in both 
consumer choice and provider revenue-management in 
the presence of such factors as the price 
competitiveness of domestic commodities relative to 
foreign commodities.  The basket of commodities 
relevant to the decision-making of both consumers and 
providers may be used to measure the price 
competitiveness of domestic commodities relative to 
foreign commodities by a real exchange rate, a 
price-adjusted nominal exchange rate, as computed by 
PePer /*= , where *P and P represent relevant 
indexes of foreign and domestic prices, respectively. 
For a country as a whole, one of the major revenue 
management tasks confronting a government is the 
problem of keeping a trade balance, which is equivalent 
to bringing MeM r−*  to equality, where re  
represents the relative price of imports in terms of 
domestic goods and converts quantities of foreign 
goods M into their equivalent in domestic goods Mer . 
The competitiveness of domestic goods in international 
markets may be partially examined by the change in the 
real exchange rate. While domestic goods would 
become relatively expensive as compared with foreign 
goods with a reduction of q and the competitiveness of 





worsened, an increase in q indicates that imports 
become more expensive and improves domestic 
competitiveness in international goods market. As 
stated by Rivera-Batiz and Rivera-Batiz L (1994) with 
regard to Marshall-Lerner condition, a domestic 
currency depreciation would have a positive direct 
effect on the trade balance if the sum of the price 
elasticities of demand for domestic exports and imports 
exceeds one. As the price responsiveness of domestic 
demand for foreign commodities and that of foreign 
demand for domestic commodities are large, it would 
be likely for a country to generate more revenues than 
payments on imports with a domestic currency 
depreciation. Similar concepts may be applied to 
examine issues associated with revenue management in 
service industries with *P and P computed on the 
basis of a standard basket of service commodities in 
deriving and representing the price competitiveness of 
domestic service commodities relative to foreign 
service commodities. Furthermore, within a global 
interactive context, information regarding exchange 
rates and domestic and foreign prices and demand are 
indispensable to the decision making of both service 
consumers and providers.  
 
4. INFORMATION STRUCTURE 
 
Researchers have attempted to understand 
conflict and cooperation within an interactive 
managerial context with states evolving over time. As 
mentioned by Myerson, (1991), in a well-defined 
interactive framework such as a game the 
decision-makers are generally assumed to be rational 
and intelligent in the sense that a rational 
decision-maker makes decisions consistently in pursuit 
of his own objectives and an intelligent decision-maker 
knows everything about the situation and is able to 
make any inferences about the situation. Furthermore, 
he noted that it may never be satisfied that all 
individuals are perfectly rational and intelligent and 
individuals may learn in the process of interaction.  
While Myerson stated “each of these adjectives is used 
here in a technical sense that requires some 
explanation” (p. 4), the concept of intelligence was not 
adequately explained and his explanations appeared to 
be based considerably on a measure-theoretic 
framework.  
Human intelligence appears to be associated with 
information and knowledge. Theoretical perspectives of 
information and ideas applied to tackle problems 
associated with information tend to be constructed with 
measure-theoretic concepts. As mentioned by 
Billingsley (1986) with regard to partial information, 
with a probability measure space of the 
triple },,{ PFΩ , where Ω  is a nonempty outcome 
space and P is a probability measure defined on F , a 
subclass A~  of F corresponds heuristically to partial 
information and the concept of information can be 
represented in terms of partitions. For ω  and ω′  in 
Ω , if, for every A  in A~ , ω  and ω′  belong both 
to A or cA , the two outcomes can be viewed as 
A~ -equivalent. In this perspective, the A~ -partition 
partitions Ω  into sets of equivalent points. 
Furthermore, as noted by Billingsley, the A~ -partition 
coincides with the )~(Aσ - partition because 
A~ -equivalence and )
~(Aσ -equivalence are the same 
thing. For fixed ω  and ω′ , ω  and ω′  
are A~ -equivalent if they are )
~(Aσ -equivalent. On the 
other hand, the class of A  such that  ω  and ω′  
lie either both in A or cA  is a σ -field.  This 
σ -field contains A~  and hence )~(Aσ  if ω  and 
ω′  are A~ -equivalent, so that ω  and ω′ are also 
)~(Aσ -equivalent. As implied by the properties, with 
the information in )~(Aσ  an observer is meant to 
know not the pointω  drawn, but the equivalence class 
containing it. In defining strategies for a game with a 
correlating device with similar measure-theoretic 
concepts, Fudenburg and Tirole (1992) stated the 
concept of a correlating device as a 
triple }},{,{ PH iΩ , where Ω  is a state space 
corresponding to the outcomes of the device and P  is 
a probability measure on the state space Ω . An 
information partition iH  is a partition of a finite set 
Ω  and assigns an hi(ω ) to each ω , where hi(ω ) 
consists of those states that an economic agent regards 
as possible with the true stateω .  An economic agent 
is poorly informed and he has no information at all 
beyond his prior if his partition is the one-element set 
Ω .  
Theoretical or empirical research can be 
conducted within a measure-theoretic information 
structure by examining outcome spaces, information 
partitions or probability measures with regard to 
research problems. A general outcome space can be 
viewed as a joint outcome space formed by the 
Cartesian product of the nature, demand, and supply 
outcome spaces. A nature outcome space may include 
such uncontrollable exogenous outcomes as weather, 
weather-related outcomes, and outcomes related to 
social and economic contexts with such components as 
cultures, tax structures, operation regulations, and 




demand outcome space may include such elements as 
consumer preference, income, location, beliefs and 
belief-updating mechanism in addition to consumption 
externalities, while a production outcome space may 
include technologies, facility operation states, labor 
types and productivities, materials and quality, and 
production externalities. A corresponding probability 
measure may be defined on a field in the joint outcome 




With the expansion of production, exchange, and 
consumption, service industries have been evolving as 
the major industries in the global economy and need 
support from research on issues related to service 
science and management to promote further growth and 
extend the expansion boundaries. The research topics 
and areas appropriate for immediate research interests 
on this evolving academic and practical domain  may 
include, but not limited to, pricing of services, quality 
management and quality signaling, service standards 
management, customer relationship management, 
production and operations management of services, 
location and facility planning, service delivery, service 
supply chain management, service delivery process, 
E-commerce and operations, information technology 
and communication in services, healthcare management, 
insurance and healthcare management, and contracts 
and mechanism design. In this paper, some of the 
crucial issues associated with consumer choice, global 
price responsiveness, and information structure have 
been examined to provide suggestions for future 
research on revenue management with incomplete 
information and to induce further repercussion in the 
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